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FOREWORD: ROOT CAUSES OF THE PRO SE
PRISONER LITIGATION CRISIS
Michael W. Martin*
INTRODUCTION
In the 1968 film Bananas, Woody Allen portrays the pro se protagonist
Fielding Mellish, who is on trial for treason, as a zany, bumbling, selfrepresented litigant who somehow manages to cross-examine himself and
later devastate the government’s key witness against him while bound and
gagged pursuant to a court order.1 Pro se litigation rarely evokes such
humor and unmitigated success.
Shon Hopwood, author of the following Essay, is no Fielding Mellish.
Despite having no legal formal training until this fall,2 Shon has become
adroit at doing what every big firm appellate practice only hopes to do:
sculpting certiorari-worthy appeals to the Supreme Court involving pro se
prisoners. Shon gained his expertise the hard way—through ten years in
prison for a string of bank robberies and a life he has long since left behind.
This hard-earned experience, as well as his subsequent success in
shepherding cert-worthy petitions to the Supreme Court, gives Shon a
unique and credible voice to speak on legal issues that affect inmates. His
Essay argues for three changes to prisoner civil rights law and practice: (1)
removing the one-year statute of limitations for non-capital federal cases
found in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19963
(AEDPA); (2) permitting pro se prisoners with inadequate medical care
claims to conduct depositions without cost via the in forma pauperis

* Clinical Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law and the
2010–11 Chair of the American Association of Law Schools’ Section on Litigation. The
author wishes to thank research assistant Masao Michael Takahashi for his assistance with
this Foreword.
1. BANANAS (United Artists 1971).
2. Shon is now a 1L at the University of Washington School of Law.
3. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). Before the passage of AEDPA, there was no statutorily
prescribed statute of limitations in filing habeas corpus petitions in federal courts. See Eric
D. Kelderman, Note, Fairness in Habeas Petition Filings for Pro Se Prisoners: The
Propriety of the Eighth Circuit’s Holding in Nichols v. Bowersox, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV.
359, 359 (2000). This one-year statute of limitations impedes many prisoner cases from
even reaching the courts, regardless of their merits, because prisoners with low literacy
levels or inadequate access to legal information may not take notice of AEDPA’s time limit;
even when they know of the time limit, they may have difficulty in timely filing their
petitions. See Jessica Feierman, “The Power of the Pen”: Jailhouse Lawyers, Literacy, and
Civic Engagement, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 379 (2006).
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statute;4 and (3) providing online education, creating forms and sample
briefs, and permitting “unbundled” legal services5—including the bar’s
permission for ghost-writing briefs—for pro se appellants.6
This Foreword is not a critique of Shon’s proposals. Instead, it lends
support to an underlying premise of Shon’s Essay: the stakes are high in
pro se prisoner litigation, and the system struggles to handle the actions as
fairly as it should. This Foreword will spotlight the root causes behind the
pro se prisoner litigation dilemma, focusing on the following: (1) the
vibrant rights regime of the United States that enables inmates to challenge
their conditions of confinement, as well as their underlying convictions; (2)
the need for inmates to challenge these conditions of confinement and
underlying convictions; (3) the prison population boom; (4) the literacy,
language, mental health, and resource deficits of the inmate population; (5)
the failure of the bar to meet the inmates’ legal needs; and (6) ethical and
financial constraints on the courts’ ability to otherwise level the playing
field.
I. THE UNITED STATES’ ROBUST RIGHTS REGIME
Let us start with the positive: relative to most nations, the United States
has a robust rights regime under which inmates may seek to grieve their
conditions of confinement or length of sentence. We have numerous
constitutional provisions and statutes that protect civil liberties and rights,
and a strong, independent judiciary that compels respect for these laws.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that inmates do not shed all civil
rights upon passing through the prison gates; rather, they retain an array of
rights—including a constitutional right of access to the courts7—which
prison officials have an affirmative duty to safeguard.8 The opening
paragraph of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Brown v. Plata9 captures this rights
regime’s strength: “Today the Court affirms what is perhaps the most
radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history: an order
requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 convicted
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2006).
5. “[U]nbundled legal services [are t]he provision of legal services by an attorney who
does not represent the client or take over the entire case, but performs specific services such
as appearing at one hearing, preparing a legal brief, or negotiating a settlement after the
client has prepared the case as a self-represented party. Most common in divorce cases.”
Unbundled Legal Services, NOLO’S PLAIN ENG. L. DICTIONARY, http://www.nolo.com/
dictionary/unbundled-legal-services-term.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
6. See Shon Hopwood, Slicing Through the Great Legal Gordian Knot: Ways to Assist
Pro Se Litigants in Their Quest for Justice, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229 (2011).
7. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969) (“Tennessee could not
constitutionally adopt and enforce a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated prisoners to
file habeas corpus petitions.”); see also Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of
Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 283 (2010).
8. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825–26 (1977) (“If a lawyer must perform such
preliminary research, it is no less vital for a pro se prisoner.”); see also Benjamin R. Dryden,
Technological Leaps and Bounds: Pro Se Prisoner Litigation in the Internet Age, 10 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 819, 819–20 (2008); Robbins, supra note 7, at 283.
9. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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criminals.”10 Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Plata allowed for this
radical result because the Court found that prison overcrowding in
California had led to the “medical and mental health care provided by
California’s prisons fall[ing] below the standard of decency that inheres in
the Eighth Amendment.”11 Underlying the Plata majority’s decision was
the understanding that inmates retain certain basic rights:
As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be deprived of
rights that are fundamental to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution
demand recognition of certain other rights. Prisoners retain the essence of
human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.12

Not surprisingly, inmates regularly make use of this rights regime. From
2005 to 2010, inmates filed almost 330,000 petitions in federal courts
claiming guards’ use of excessive force, deliberate indifference to their
medical needs, and retaliation for their assertion of rights, among other
claims.13 State prisoners challenging their conviction or sentence file
approximately 17,000 of the nearly 55,000 cases filed each year, even
though at least one state appellate court has reviewed and upheld that
conviction or sentence.14
Of course, inmates have long had fewer, less robust civil rights than the
average citizen,15 and these rights have only become more restricted over
the past two decades with the passage of AEDPA16 and the Prison
10. Id. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 1947 (majority opinion).
12. Id. at 1928.
13. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 88 (2005) [hereinafter
2005 JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2005/tables/s24.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 97 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial
Business/2006/tables/s24.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 79
(2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/
tables/S23Sep07.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 78 (2008),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2008/tables/
S23Sep08.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 75 (2009), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S23Sep09.pdf;
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 78 (2010), [hereinafter 2010
JUDICIAL BUSINESS] available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial
Business/2010/tables/S23Sep10.pdf; see also Maureen Markey Middleton, Typical Section
1983 Claims, FINDLAW, http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jan/1/126485.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2011) (discussing typical prisoner rights claims).
14. Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Op-Ed., Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at WK8.
15. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (holding that prisoners
have only limited due process rights in prison disciplinary proceedings); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (asserting that prisoners retain only those First Amendment rights
that are not inconsistent with their status as prisoners or with the legitimate goals of the
corrections system).
16. Indeed, prisoner petitions are down from 61,238 in 2005 to 51,901 in 2010.
Compare 2005 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 13, at 88, with 2010 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra
note 13, at 78. AEDPA and the PLRA have much to do with that reduction. In addition to
the one-year statute of limitations that Shon addresses, AEDPA also prohibits prisoners from
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Litigation Reform Act of 199517 (PLRA). Further, though inmates
regularly make use of their right to petition for habeas corpus relief, less
than two-fifths of one percent of those petitions receive any type of relief,
and that relief often is a new trial or sentence that results in the inmate’s
return to prison.18
Nonetheless, the rights available to inmates clearly contribute to the
crush of pro se litigation on the court system. In 2010, pro se prisoners
filed 48,581 cases (66.6 percent) of the 72,900 pro se cases filed in federal
district courts.19 Pro se litigants filed 27,209 petitions of the 55,992
petitions filed in the circuits, with pro se inmates filing 14,067 (51.7
percent) of them.20 These numbers are drastically higher than in 1960,
when prisoners filed only 2,000 actions in federal district courts.21 The
factors outlined below attempt to explain the 2,400 percent increase in
filings between 1960 and 2010.
II. THE NEED FOR COURTS TO REVIEW CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AND
INMATES’ UNDERLYING CONVICTIONS
If the U.S. rights regime is the good news, the bad news is that inmates
often have to make use of this rights regime. In the United States,
conditions of confinement have long been an issue,22 and are even more so

filing successive petitions on the same issues drastically cuts prisoners’ ability to submit
successive petitions on new issues (undermining prisoners’ ability to rectify deficiencies of
their initial petitions), and requires deference to state court decisions, barring federal courts
from hearing prisoners’ petitions even when they have a valid federal claim. See Feierman,
supra note 3, at 379.
17. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997h (2006)). The PLRA’s obstacles on prisoner court access include
requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court—a
challenge for low-literacy prisoners—and to pay fees in full, posing a strong disincentive to
poor prisoners. Feierman, supra note 3, at 380.
18. See Hoffman & King, supra note 14. The authors argue that Congress should limit
federal review of state criminal cases to capital cases or cases in which inmates produce
persuasive new evidence of innocence. See id.
19. Federal Caseload Trend: More Civil Cases Being Filed Without Lawyer’s Help,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (June 15, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/
NewsView/11-06-15/Federal_Caseload_Trend_More_Civil_Cases_Being_Filed_Without_
Lawyer_s_Help.aspx.
20. 2010 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 13, at 47. Unfortunately, there does not appear
to be comprehensive statistics on pro se litigants in state courts. See Nina Ingwer
VanWormer, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se
Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 989 (2007). This is partly because many states do not
track such statistics; and of the states that keep such statistics, many do not keep precise or
detailed statistics on pro se litigants. Id. at 989–90.
21. Pro Se Law Clerks: A Valuable Resource, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
(Apr.
2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-04-01/Pro_Se_Law_
Clerks_A_Valuable_Resource.aspx [hereinafter Pro Se Law Clerks].
22. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Report Details Wide Abuse in Los Angeles Jail System,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at A12 (reporting a long history of accusations of abuse and
poor conditions in Los Angeles jails).
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now due to budget cuts.23 Indeed, human rights organizations have called
the United States to task over the PLRA and AEDPA restrictions, as well as
the treatment of inmates generally.24 In addition, the state justice system is
so overwhelmed with the crush of cases from America’s war on crime that
some convictions need a second look, particularly now as fiscal resources
require everyone—courts, prosecutors, and defense lawyers—to do more
with less.25 As the research develops on how bias affects jurors and
judges26 and how eyewitness testimony is far less reliable than originally
believed,27 along with the rise of using DNA evidence to challenge jury
verdicts,28 the need to review convictions grows. Our justice system
survives because of the nation’s faith in it, and it is subject to collapse if
innocents are serving time for crimes they never committed. For this
reason, the courts take potential faulty conviction cases very seriously.
III. THE PRISON POPULATION BOOM
The single most important factor in the pro se prisoner litigation crush is
that the United States has both the highest number of persons incarcerated29

23. Cutbacks in prison budgets lead to overcrowding and understaffing, leaving inmates
and correctional staff at risk. See, e.g., Celeste Katz, State Corrections Union Says Prison
Budget Cuts Could Be “Catastrophic,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 9, 2011, 3:59 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2011/02/state-corrections-union-saysprison-budget-cuts-could-be-catastrophic. See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011) (holding that prison overcrowding in California leads to prison conditions that fall
below standard of decency inherent in the Eighth Amendment).
24. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2010: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 345–46 (2010).
25. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Clout to Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2011, at A1 (reporting prosecutor resistance to passing new crime laws as
budgets are being cut).
26. See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Andrew J. Wistrich,
Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
27. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 9 (2011) (finding that of the first 250 cases of exoneration via
DNA evidence, 190 cases (76 percent) involved eyewitness misidentification); see also MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2011) (prohibiting prosecutors from
seeking the death penalty unless they have DNA evidence, a videotape of the crime, or a
videotaped voluntary confession from the suspect); Perry v. New Hampshire, 131 S. Ct.
2932, 2932 (2011) (granting certiorari on the first Supreme Court case in thirty-four years
involving eyewitness identification with a claim that eyewitness identification while
defendant was standing with police officer was too suggestive); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d
872, 877–78 (N.J. 2011) (requiring tighter restrictions for admission of eyewitness
testimony).
28. GARRETT, supra note 27, at 100.
29. Entire World—Prison Population Totals, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poptota
l (last visited Nov. 16, 2011); see also One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008, PEW CTR.
ON
THE
STATES 3 (2008), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
One%20in%20100.pdf [hereinafter One in 100] (noting the rapidly increasing incarceration
rates).
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and the highest incarceration rate in the world.30 At the end of 2009, the
United States had 2,292,133 adult prisoners, accounting for 743 per
100,000 residents, or about 1 percent of adults in the U.S. resident
population.31 China, four times more populous than the United States, has
the second most incarcerated individuals at 1.6 million.32 This has not
always been the case. Indeed, the U.S. incarcerated population more than
quadrupled between 1910 and 1980, from 112,362 to 474,368; accounting
for the nation’s population growth, the incarceration rate increased by about
70 percent, from 121.8 inmates per 100,000 residents to 209.39.33 Since
1980, the prison and jail population has boomed, spiking from 1,146,401 in
1990, to 1,929,867 in 2000, and to more than two million in 2009.34
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198635 is one of the biggest contributors to
the incarcerated population boom. The Act caused a dramatic increase in
incarceration for nonviolent offenses and included mandatory minimum
sentences for the distribution of cocaine, including far more severe
punishment for distribution of crack than powder cocaine.36 In 1981,

30. Entire World—Prison Population Rates Per 100,000 of the National Population,
INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_
stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
31. United
States
of
America,
INT’L
CTR.
FOR
PRISON
STUDIES,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=190 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2011); see also LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009 (Dec. 2010), available at http://bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpus09.pdf; One in 100, supra note 29, at 3; Total Correctional Population,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11 (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
Press releases and publications by the Department of Justice list the incarceration rate in the
United States in 2009 sometimes as 502 and sometimes 743 per 100,000 people. Compare
Key Facts at a Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.gov/content/
glance/tables/incrttab.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (listing it as 502), with GLAZE, supra,
at 7 app. tbl.2 (listing it as 743). The incarceration rate of 502 reflects the number of
prisoners sentenced to more than one year under state or federal jurisdiction (1,548,721 of
1,613,740 that include those sentenced to one year or less), which do not include the number
of inmates in local jails per 100,000 U.S. residents. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN
2009, at 2 tbl.1 n.b (Dec. 2010), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf. On the
other hand, the incarceration rate of 743—the most commonly used number—reflects the
number of inmates held in custody in state or federal prisons or in local jails (2,292,133 in
total) per 100,000 U.S. residents. GLAZE, supra, at 7 app. tbl.2 & n.e.
32. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’: Tough Laws and Long
Terms Create Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1.
33. The Punishing Decade: Prison and Jail Estimates at the Millennium, JUSTICE
POLICY INST. 1, 4 (May 2000), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/00-05_rep_
punishingdecade_ac.pdf [hereinafter The Punishing Decade].
34. Key Facts at a Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.gov/content/glance/
tables/corr2tab.cfm (last updated Oct. 13, 2011) (including both jail and prison inmates in
the calculation).
35. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
36. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act created a 100-to-1 cocaine-to-crack ratio that allowed
mandatory minimum sentences of five and ten years to apply to offenses involving as little
as five grams (less than 0.2 ounces) to fifty grams (less than 2 ounces) of crack, respectively.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) (an offense involving five grams of crack, as opposed to 500
grams of cocaine, is assigned a five-year minimum sentence; an offense involving fifty
grams of crack, as opposed to 5,000 grams of cocaine, is assigned a ten-year minimum
sentence). The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 alleviated some of this disparity by reducing the
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40,000 people were in prison for drug offenses; today, that number is
approximately half a million—a 1,100 percent increase—accounting for
two-thirds of the federal inmate population.37
Other law enforcement innovations—such as the “quality of life” arrests
championed by the Giuliani Administration in New York City38 and
adopted thereafter by most major cities,39 as well as longer sentences,40
which are dramatically longer than those in most industrialized
countries41—continue to fuel the prison population growth.42 States’
adoption of a host of correctional policies and practices have ensured the
boom’s continuance.43 As politically popular as these federal, state, and
city “wars against crime” have been, they have resulted in a present-day
prison population that is almost five times larger than it was in 1980.
IV. THE PLIGHT OF THE INMATE
The plight of the inmates themselves further complicates the pro se
prisoner picture. Many enter prison with literacy and language deficits that
disable their ability to properly marshal evidence and advocate on their own
behalf.44
The inability to depose and cross-examine witnesses is
particularly problematic because so many cases turn on credibility.

ratio to 18-to-1, but it is not explicitly retroactive. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
37. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2010).
38. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, A Quality-of-Life Offense? It Could End Up in an
Arrest., N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1994, at B3; Joyce Purnick, Quality of Life Works 2 Ways in
Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1996, at B1.
39. See Jailing Communities: The Impact of Jail Expansion and Effective Public Safety
Strategies, JUSTICE POLICY INST. 8 (Apr. 2008), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/
08-04_REP_JailingCommunities_AC.pdf.
40. See Oppel, supra note 25 (reporting prosecutor resistance to passing new crime laws
as budgets are being cut). Longer sentences are fueled in part by statutory mandatory
minimum sentences, such as for illegal narcotics distribution, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; three-strikes laws, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667
(West 2011); and career offender sentencing guideline provisions, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2010).
41. See Liptak, supra note 32.
42. The Punishing Decade, supra note 33, at 8 (asserting that quality of life arrests lead
to larger prison populations).
43. See One in 100, supra note 29, at 9. For example, between 1993 and 2007, the
prison inmate population in Florida increased from 53,000 to over 97,000. During this
period, in 1995, the Florida legislature “abolished ‘good time’ credits and discretionary
release by the parole board, . . . requir[ing] that all prisoners—regardless of their crime, prior
record, or risk to recidivate—serve 85 percent of their sentence.” Id. It was followed by a
“zero tolerance” policy and other measures mandating that probation officers report every
offender who violated any condition of supervision and increasing prison time for these
“technical violations.” Id. This resulted in an increase in the number of violators in Florida
prisons by an estimated 12,000. Although crime in Florida has dropped substantially during
this period, some other states have also seen a decrease in crime without prison population
growth. See id. at 9–10.
44. In one case, the Eleventh Circuit held that an adequate library satisfied the right of
access to the courts, even if the prisoner was illiterate. See Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d
1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1985).
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The steady rise in mental health issues in the prison population adds to
this plight. At mid-year 2005, more than half of all prison and jail inmates
had a mental health problem, including 705,600 inmates in state prisons (56
percent of state prisoners), and 78,800 in federal prisons (45 percent of
federal prisoners), and 479,900 in local jails (64 percent of local jail
inmates).45 The National Institute of Health reported that there was an
increasing number of persons with mental illness coming into contact with
the criminal justice system, estimated at as many as two million, including
those who have co-occurring substance abuse disorders.46 Also, a 2009
study on serious mental illness among prison inmates reported that the rate
of current serious mental illness for male inmates was 14.5 percent and for
female inmates was 31 percent.47
Finally, incarceration itself imposes upon pro se prisoners another layer
of steep disadvantages that non-prisoner pro se litigants do not face.48 They
have restricted access to libraries, legal materials, the internet, and
telephones.49 The limited resources available within prisons are often
inadequate to allow prisoners to navigate the complex legal system50 and
consistently contribute to their losing cases on procedural grounds before
ever reaching a decision on the merits.51
V. NO BAR TO HELP
A lack of legal representation prejudices all pro se litigants, prisoners or
otherwise, in obvious and subtle ways. The ability to build a case,
strategize in accordance with a case theory, avoid pleading and discovery
pitfalls, survive motion practice, and tell a persuasive story to the jury are
all skills that are particular to lawyers.
The absence of legal representation is particularly harmful to prisoners.
First, save for a few prisoner rights stalwarts (and they all know each other),

45. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT:
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (Sept. 2006), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf; see also Survey: Most Inmates Show Mental
Symptoms, MSNBC.COM (Sept. 6, 2008, 8:41 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
14707120/ns/health-mental_health/t/survey-most-inmates-show-mental-symptoms.
46. Morris L. Thigpen, Welcome to Corrections & Mental Health, NAT’L INST. CORR.
(Mar. 3, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://community.nicic.gov/blogs/mentalhealth/archive/2011/03/
03/welcome-to-corrections-amp-mental-health.aspx.
47. Henry J. Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates,
60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 761, 761–65 (2009).
48. Robbins, supra note 7, at 273.
49. Id.; see also Dryden, supra note 8, at 865 (“The Internet Revolution has only left one
segment of our society behind: prisoners, who ironically are those who have the most to
gain from the knowledge freely available thereon.”); Feierman, supra note 3, at 370
(“Prisoners are dependent on the prison system for access to law books, legal resources, and
often also for their education about the law.”).
50. Robbins, supra note 7, at 279.
51. Id. at 273. Moreover, the Court in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), limited the
right of access to: the right to file the initial papers, direct appeals of criminal convictions,
habeas corpus petitions, and civil rights actions challenging conditions of confinement—not
to “litigate effectively once in court.” Id. at 354; see also Robbins, supra note 7, at 284.
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there is no dedicated prisoner civil rights bar.52 This stands in stark contrast
to employment discrimination—another large source of pro se filings in
federal court53—which has a vibrant plaintiff and defense bar.
Second, most prisoners cannot afford to hire an attorney,54 and even if
they could, many attorneys are “unwilling or unable to take on full
representation of prisoner litigants.”55 Add to the inmates’ dilemma that
they must deal with (1) the PLRA and AEDPA obstacles;56 (2) case law
such as Ashcroft v. Iqbal,57 the seminal Supreme Court case that heightened
pleading standards in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions;58 (3) the highly restrictive
and poorly resourced prisons; and (4) the literacy, language, and mental
health deficits,59 and the conclusion is clear: pro se status is particularly
lethal to prisoner civil rights actions.
VI. A SYSTEM OVERWHELMED
Without attorneys, the burden falls directly upon the courts to ensure
basic fairness exists in pro se prisoner litigation; however, they are limited
in what they can do for pro se prisoner litigants. First, as neutral arbiters,
the Judicial Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees
limit the assistance that courts may provide the pro se litigant.60 Second,
and perhaps more importantly, judicial resources constrain the courts from
assisting. Pro se cases are resource-intensive because (1) there are so many;
(2) the briefing is subpar to nonexistent; (3) a lawyer-driven civil discovery
system does not function well with pro se inmates; and (4) many of the
prison cases, such as excessive force cases, are summary-judgment-proof,
thus requiring trials with pro se litigants (who struggle with trial practice).
In addition, there are other pro se cases with which courts must deal,61 not
to mention a full docket of attorney-represented cases, especially criminal

52. Among all prisoner petitions filed in federal courts in 2010, 93.6 percent were filed
pro se. 2010 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 13, at 88–90.
53. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 434 tbl.1 (2004)
(reporting that 16.99 percent of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases proceeded pro
se).
54. Robbins, supra note 7, at 277; see also Feierman, supra note 3, at 369 (“Most
prisoners are indigent and must represent themselves pro se in both civil suits and habeas
petitions.”).
55. Robbins, supra note 7, at 273.
56. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. The PLRA limits attorney’s fees to
150 percent of any monetary award received after trial. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006).
57. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
58. See id. at 1943.
59. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
60. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES CANON 3 (2011); CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
JUDICIAL EMPS. CANON 2 (2011).
61. Interestingly, though the total number of petitions by prisoners has decreased from
61,238 in 2005 to 51,901 in 2010, see supra note 16, the total number of petitions by nonprisoners has increased from 192,035 to 230,994 during the same period. Compare 2005
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 13, at 88, with 2010 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 13, at 78.
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cases with speedy trial obligations. Thus, though the courts may attempt to
limit prejudice, they can only go so far.62
CONCLUSION
For the pro se litigant, fundamental rights have allegedly been impinged,
and the litigant is forced to navigate systems with which even attorneys—
professionals with expertise and long academic training—struggle. For the
judiciary, pro se cases overwhelm courts’ dockets and require extra effort
and attention, given that the pro se litigants lack legal training and the
judicial system typically relies on lawyers to self-police the civil dockets.
For lawyers, pro se litigants represent the failure of a profession given a
monopoly on legal services and its inability to absorb the impoverished who
have claims against another. To the extent pro se litigation scars the
judiciary and the legal profession, society as a whole suffers.
The pro se inmate dilemma is the pro se problem’s perfect storm. The
clear precipitants outlined above result in a large class of legally
disempowered persons—most of whom have educational, mental health,
and resource deficits to boot—with compromised rights so fundamental
(e.g., wrongful convictions, inmate beatings, and rape) that society
grimaces at the possibility of impingement. Further, pro se prisoner
litigation comprises the largest portion by far63 of the federal pro se docket,
and threatens to overwhelm the courts. Finally, unlike employment
discrimination, pro se prisoner actions lack the financial incentives to
ensure that a large dedicated group of attorneys will seek to prosecute the
rights of inmates. Given this scenario, the suggestions of Shon Hopwood
that follow here deserve attention and thought.

62. Over the past three decades, many courts have leveraged their limited resources to
create pro se offices that can more efficiently deal with issues peculiar to pro se litigants. See
generally Pro Se Law Clerks, supra note 21. The pro se offices often play the dual functions
of assisting the courts in ensuring that pro se pleadings merit the courts’ involvement, as well
as assisting the litigants, largely through procedural advice and assistance in finding pro
bono counsel. See id.
63. Pro se prisoners filed approximately twice as many actions in federal court as all
non-prisoner pro se litigants in 2010. See 2010 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 13, at 78.

